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Focusing on a set of central banks that publish their internal macroeconomic forecasts in real 
time enables one to shed light on the expectations channel of monetary policy. The main 
contribution of this paper is to assess whether central bank forecasts influence private 
forecasts. The response is positive for inflation forecasts in Sweden, the UK and Japan. To 
disentangle the sources of influence of central banks, two concepts are proposed: endogenous 
influence, which is due to more accurate central bank forecasts, and exogenous influence, which 
is due to central bank signals on either future policy decisions or private information. 
Original empirical evidence on the central bank forecasting performance relative to private 
agents is provided, and estimates show that in Sweden, more accurate inflation forecasts 
generate specific central bank influence that is different from the influence from signals. The 
publication of forecasts may therefore refer to two central banking strategies that aim to 
shape private expectations: forecasting or policymaking.  
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1. Introduction 
 
In recent decades, there has been strong interest in transparency and information issues in 
monetary policy, with emphasis on the role of expectations in policy outcomes. The 
expectations channel of monetary policy has become increasingly important in the most 
recent macroeconomic models, which consider central banking as the management of 
expectations. Can central banks influence private expectations? Are central banks able to 
convey information to private agents? Is greater transparency sufficient to influence private 
expectations? What are the sources of influence of central banks? These questions are 
essential because they contribute to the assessment of the importance of one of the most 
uncertain and subtle channels of monetary policy.  
 
A large body of literature has dealt with the costs and benefits of publishing forecasts, 
among which are Faust and Svensson (2001, 2002), Geraats (2002, 2005), Woodford (2005) 
and Eusepi and Preston (2008). With the development of inflation targeting policies, central 
bank forecasts have become a central tool of central bank communication. Theoretically, an 
influential central bank is supposed to make monetary policy implementation more effective 
due to its impact on private expectations, at least in terms of the interpretation of policy 
actions, reduction in transmission lags and reputation. However, few studies have 
empirically assessed whether central bank forecasts influence private forecasts. This question 
is important: Bernanke and Woodford (1997) and Muto (2011) reached opposite conclusions 
on the effects of the direction of the link between central bank forecasts and private forecasts. 
The former showed that a monetary policy that is influenced by private expectations could 
lead to indeterminacy, while the latter argued that when private forecasts follow central 
bank forecasts, policymakers must respond more strongly to expected inflation to achieve 
macroeconomic stability. In addition, focusing on the informative value of prices, Amato and 
Shin (2006) developed a model for influence; they emphasized that as the policymaker, the 
central bank shapes private expectations. Finally, central bank influence may cause private 
agents to stop forming their specific sets of information and only refer to information from 
the central bank. Morris and Shin (2002) argued that there might be a crowding-out effect of 
public information on independent sources of information.  
 
The main contribution of this paper is to assess whether central bank forecasts influence 
private forecasts in five countries: Sweden, the United Kingdom, Canada, Japan, and 
Switzerland. These are countries in which central bank forecasts are published in real time. 
We focus specifically on this set of communicating central banks because they make their 
macroeconomic forecasts public, which enables the emphasis of the expectations channel and 
the influence of central banks. Some studies have tested whether central bank forecasts or the 
degree of central bank transparency have impacts on private forecasts. Fujiwara (2005) 
showed that the Bank of Japan influences private forecasts, while Ehrmann, Eijffinger and 
Fratzscher (2009) analyzed whether central bank transparency reduces dispersion in private 
forecasts. However, both analyses focused on the dispersion of forecasts. In this paper, we 
evaluate the influence of central bank forecasts on private forecasts and provide original 
empirical evidence on the direction of the leader-follower scheme of the monetary process. 
 
In related analyses, Levin, Natalucci and Piger (2004), Gürkaynak, Levin and Swanson 
(2010), Jansen and De Haan (2007), Cecchetti and Hakkio (2009) and Capistran and Ramos-
Francia (2010) assessed the effect of increased communication and transparency on private 
expectations. Crowe (2010) found that inflation targeting adoption leads to better private 
forecasts. Kelly (2008) found that in the UK, the link between inflation and inflation   4 
expectations disappears after the implementation of inflation targeting1 and forecast 
communication, and that private expectations are better anchored in this situation. Boero, 
Smith and Wallis (2008) found that private forecasters tend to follow the GDP growth 
forecasts of the Bank of England. The present paper focuses specifically on the quantitative 
communication of central banks: their macroeconomic forecasts, and proposes to assess 
whether private and central bank forecasts influence each other. 
 
If central bank forecasts influence private forecasts, then the next question is why this is the 
case. This paper proposes a distinction to disentangle the sources of central bank influence. 
Central bank forecasts may influence private forecasts because they are more accurate or 
because they convey signals. We first define endogenous influence as the central bank 
forecasting influence arising from superior central bank forecasts. It is rational for private 
agents to follow a central bank if the central bank has a better forecasting record because it 
enables them to improve their forecasts of future macroeconomic variables. Second, we 
define exogenous influence as the influence stemming from central bank signals, either on 
future policy decisions or on private information, independent of the central bank 
forecasting performance. In an environment of imperfect information, it is optimal for 
private agents to form their forecasts based on central bank forecasts even if the information 
is noisy because these forecasts could contain useful information for private agents.  
 
This proposed distinction enables the disentanglement of whether central bank forecasts 
influence private forecasts because of the quality of the forecasts or because of the signals 
that are sent. In terms of general economic implications, this distinction is important because 
endogenous influence would drive private expectations toward the true value of variables, 
whereas exogenous influence would drive them away. In terms of policy implications, this 
distinction could be important for uncovering the sources of the influencing ability of private 
expectations through forecast communication. The shaping of private expectations could 
result from two different strategies, both of which are based on publishing central bank 
forecasts: forecasting or policymaking. Central bank forecasts could be published to give a 
more accurate vision of the economic outlook, or they could be used as tools by 
policymakers to send policy signals or reveal private information. Therefore, the theoretical 
implications for aggregate dynamics and the policy implications for central banks to manage 
private expectations and to stabilize their objective variables may be essential. 
 
To shed light on the sources of influence, the second step of this paper is to provide original 
empirical evidence on the relative forecasting performance of these five central banks, which 
publish their forecasts in real time, compared to private agents. Because this is a situation in 
which central bank information is published, and information is supposed to be symmetric, 
it also enables the assessment of whether more accurate central bank forecasts are compatible 
with forecast communication or depend on low transparency. Many authors, following the 
seminal work of Romer and Romer (2000), have assessed the relative forecasting 
performance of the US private sector and the Federal Reserve, a central bank that publishes2 
                                                 
1 Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2010) suggest that there is no robust evidence that inflation targeting increases 
inattention in inflation expectations of private forecasters. 
2 It may be argued that the Federal Reserve is not a less transparent central bank because it releases its 
policymaker (FOMC) forecasts twice per year with a three-week lag, in addition to its statements and minutes. 
However, Gavin and Mandall (2001) and Romer and Romer (2008) show that those forecasts do not contain useful 
information to predict future outcomes. Thus, the Federal Reserve is transparent and releases its non-predictive 
forecasts (FOMC forecasts), which have policy contents, while it publishes its predictive forecasts (Greenbook 
forecasts) after a five-year embargo. The five-year embargo confirms that the Greenbook forecasts have some 
value added. In the end, analyzing whether this relative opacity is good or bad is beyond the scope of this work.   5 
its Greenbook forecasts after five years, thus benefiting from an informational advantage. 
However, this study has not been extended to communicating central banks. Finally, the 
third step consists of assessing whether the weight put on central bank forecasts by private 
agents is conditional on their relative accuracy. The proposed distinction between both 
sources of influence rests on the hypothesis that more accurate central bank forecasts cause 
specific central bank influence independently of policy signals and the central bank private 
information that is revealed through central bank forecasts. 
 
This paper exploits data collected from five developed countries in which central banks are 
credible without inflationary bias and communicate their macroeconomic forecasts in real 
time. More precisely, these central banks publish their forecasts with very short delays. 
Private agents do not always know the central bank forecast when they form their own 
forecasts, but the central bank forecast of the previous quarter is always available. Surveys of 
Consensus Forecasts (CFs) are used for private sector forecasts as well as Prospera AB in 
Sweden for robustness purposes.  
 
Central bank forecasting influence is identified with influence tests for fixed events, taking 
into account the effect of new information released between forecasts at date t-1 and 
forecasts at t following the methodology used in finance literature for fixed horizons. The 
results constitute original empirical evidence and are straightforward for three out of five 
countries: Sweden, the UK and Japan, in which central bank inflation forecasts influence 
private forecasts. There is no evidence of central bank influence in Switzerland or Canada. 
These estimates are robust to different horizons and lags and to timing and sampling 
variability issues. Finally, there is no empirical support for the influence of private forecasts 
on central bank forecasts.  
 
The relative forecasting performance of central banks and the private sector is assessed 
through unconditional and conditional comparisons, following Romer and Romer (2000). We 
found that one out of five communicating central banks, the Riksbank from Sweden, has 
more accurate inflation forecasts. This result is robust to many specifications and datasets. 
This finding suggests that while its forecasts are public information, the Riksbank may have 
a specific competence in gathering or processing information between each forecast’s release, 
reconstituting a private information set. Superior forecasting performance is then compatible 
with high transparency. The third series of estimates tests whether central bank influence is 
dependent on the central bank forecasting performance in the case of Sweden and shows that 
more accurate inflation forecasts cause central bank influence. 
 
These outcomes suggest that the proposed distinction makes sense to disentangle the sources 
of influence in the cases of Sweden, and of the UK and Japan. The central bank of Sweden 
influences private forecasts through the quality of its inflation forecasts, while the latter 
needs no forecasting advantage to influence private expectations and use signals. These 
findings raise interesting implications for the rationale and policy of forecast communication.  
 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: section 2 describes the distinction between the 
sources of influence. Section 3 presents the data. Sections 4, 5 and 6 focus on the estimation of 
central bank influence, their relative forecasting performance and their relevant interactions. 
Section 7 concludes the paper.  
 
                                                                                                                                                         
However, it is reasonable to consider that the Federal Reserve is less transparent concerning its predictive (Romer 
and Romer, 2000; 2008) projections.   6 
2. Endogenous and Exogenous Sources of Influence 
 
This section describes the theoretical framework of the subsequent empirical analysis. The 
considered environment supposes rational expectations and imperfect information. The 
central bank communicates its macroeconomic forecasts to the public, which may include 
them based on their marginal utility in its forecasting function. Moreover, persistent forecast 
errors of both the central bank and private agents are possible due to information. This paper 
is articulated around two questions: 
1.  Do central bank forecasts influence private forecasts? 
2.  If yes, why? What are the sources of central bank influence?  
a.  Is it because central bank forecasts are more accurate? 
b.  Is it because central bank forecasts convey signals? 
 
Let us suppose that the central bank forecast, called
CB
tt h E y + , is the forecast of the central bank 
made at date t for a variable y (either inflation or real GDP) at date t+h:  
() |
CB
tt h C B C B C B E yy sI ε + =+ + ,             (1) 
where yCB is the central bank’s private signal on the future realization of the variable y, εCB is 
the noise associated with this signal, s is a stochastic term representing the policy signal3 the 
central bank may want to disclose to the public, and  CB I  is the information set of the central 
bank available at date t (does not contain the current inflation or GDP because the central 
bank and private agents forecast current variables; this is case h=0). The average absolute 
forecast error is denoted 
1
1
σ ++ =− ∑
n
CB
CB t t h t h Ey y
n
(| |), where n is the sample size. 
 
Private agents observe their own private signal, yPS, on the future realization of a variable y 
and central bank forecasts and form their own forecasts as a linear combination of both: 
11 αε δ +− + + =+ +
PS CB
tt h P S P SP S tt h Ey y I Ey (| ) () ,            (2) 
where 
PS
tt h E y +  is the forecast of the private sector made at date t for a variable y (either 
inflation or real GDP) at date t+h, yPS is the private sector’s private signal on the future 
realization of the variable y, εPS is the noise associated with this signal,  PS I  is the information 
set of private agents available at date t, and  11
CB
tt h Ey − ++ is the forecast made at date t-1 by the 
central bank for horizon t+h+1 (the forecast made on the same date is not necessarily 
available to private agents, as shown in section 3; the focus is therefore on forecasts that are 
definitely available to private agents). The average absolute private forecast error is denoted 
as  PS σ . Central bank forecasts might enter the private forecasting function (and then 
influence private agents) for two reasons: (a) the good forecasting performance4 of future 
realized variables by the central bank or (b) the content of signals of central bank forecasts. 
 
We therefore define endogenous influence as the central bank forecasting influence arising 
from more accurate central bank forecasts. Central bank forecasts might have lower 
forecasting errors than private forecasts and might therefore be used by private agents to 
                                                 
3 Whether the final objective of central bank forecasts is to produce good forecasts or to disclose policy signals is 
beyond the scope of this paper. For more on this topic, see the debate between Romer and Romer (2008) and 
Ellison and Sargent (2010) for FOMC forecasts. 
4 The interaction between central bank influence and relative forecasting performance highlights two other 
situations in addition to endogenous and exogenous influences. They are the situation where the central bank has 
no forecasting advantage and does not influence private agents and the situation where the central bank has a 
forecasting advantage but does not influence private agents, which reveals either a communication problem or a 
weak reputation of the central bank.   7 
produce more accurate forecasts of the economic outlook. The mechanism characterizing 
endogenous influence appears simple and sound, and one would expect that rational private 
agents would be influenced by the central bank if it has a better forecasting record5 when 
forming their own expectations. In addition, one might suppose that relatively better central 
bank forecasts would enhance its credibility and therefore further legitimize its capacity to 
influence. Endogenous influence would then be characterized by the following proposition: 
central bank forecasts influence private forecasts because they are more accurate, or: 
0 CB PS δ σσ >< Q  
 
We define exogenous influence as the central bank forecasting influence arising from the 
content of signals from central bank forecasts. Central bank forecasting influence is labeled 
exogenous to the extent that it is independent of the central bank’s forecasting performance. 
Central bank forecasts might therefore convey signals on policymakers’ preferences, 
objectives, future decisions or strategies and on their private information. 
First, the publication of forecasts allows the dissemination of information about the 
preferences, models and objectives of the central bank6 and justifies the following behavior of 
private agents who are able to infer future intentions (Geraats 2005 or Woodford 20057). 
Central bank forecasts may therefore be influential not as forecasts per se but as signals of 
f u t u r e  p o l i c y  d e c i s i o n s ,  e v e n  i f  p u b l i s h e d  forecasts are unconditional, and central bank 
communication is not pre-commitment. Gürkaynak, Sack and Swanson (2005), Swanson 
(2006) and Orphanides and Wieland (2008) provide empirical evidence that policymakers’ 
forecasts in the US convey signals on future policy decisions. 
Second, central bank forecasts may be influential if the information sets that are used to 
construct the forecasts are not nested. Influence might also derive from the statistical 
properties of the forecasts because they contain specific information. Even if the central bank 
forecast errors are larger than those of private agents, it might be optimal for private agents 
to update their own forecasts after the publication of central bank forecasts as long as they 
could contain marginal information outside the information set of private agents. Exogenous 
influence is characterized by stating that it is rational that the weight placed on central bank 
forecasts is positive when central banks send signals and/or information sets are not nested: 
00 δ >≠ ∨ > CB PS if sI I  
 
Moreover, a key difference between these two types of influence is that exogenous influence 
is exclusive, whereas endogenous influence is non-exclusive, according to the criteria of the 
superior accuracy of central bank forecasts. An endogenously influential central bank could 
also send signals as long as they do not deteriorate its forecast accuracy below the level of 
accuracy of private forecasts. 
                                                 
5 One might suppose that the mechanism of endogenous influence might be self-maintained. If a central bank has 
a forecasting advantage (for any reason), then private agents will not invest in information processing because 
they know that central bank forecasts are more accurate. They will be influenced by these central bank forecasts. 
Because the private agents do not improve their forecasting ability, it makes their future forecasts inferior to those 
of the central bank and justifies the fact that they follow the forecasts of the central bank. 
6 Exogenous influence may attest to the credibility6 of the monetary policy regime and arise from coordination 
games between economic agents to form their expectations in a context of imperfect information and higher order 
expectations. In a similar context, Phelps (1983), Wilson and Rhodes (1997) and Demertzis and Viegi (2008) show 
that monetary policy can be viewed as a coordination game between the central bank and private agents, that a 
commonly accepted leader provides a focal point for followers and that monetary policy with quantitative 
communication might provide individuals with better anchors for coordinating their expectations, respectively. 
Diron and Mojon (2008) provide empirical evidence of the notion of central bank targets as a focal point for 
expectations to converge.  
7 See Walsh (2007) or Baeriswyl and Cornand (2010), who focus on the signaling role of central bank actions.   8 
The test for endogenous influence consists of assessing whether the weight placed on central 
bank forecasts can be decomposed between the effect of superior forecasts (the fact that  0 δ >  
because central bank forecasts are better) and the effect of signals. Endogenous influence 
requires the testing of whether influence, δ, is conditional to superior forecast accuracy. The 
test for exogenous influence would assess whether the weight of central bank forecasts is 
higher than the weight justified by the signal precision.  
 
Combining these relationships to the data requires some identifying assumptions: (i) because 
the precision of policy signals is not quantifiable, it is assumed that when central bank 
forecasts are not more accurate, a positive and significant weight characterizes an influence 
from central bank signals, independent of the forecasting performance; and (ii) to test for 
endogenous influence, it is assumed that private agents decide to incorporate or not 
incorporate central bank forecasts based on an index of the forecasting performance for the 
previous period (not the average performance) to obtain variations from the data and 
disentangle periods of better or worse forecasting performance and their effect on δ. The 
empirical analysis is therefore structured into three questions: 
1.  Do central bank forecasts influence private forecasts, i.e., 0 δ > ? 
2.  Are central bank forecasts more accurate, i.e., σCB < σPS? 
3.  Does central bank influence depend on its forecasting record, i.e., 0 CB PS δ σσ >< Q ? 
 
The proposed distinction consists of disentangling the sources of the central bank’s influence 
and whether the influence arising from better forecasting performance can be differentiated 
from the influence due to signals alone. This distinction is important because it would enable 
the differentiation of influence moving private expectations toward the fundamental value of 
future variables from the opposite: a self-fulfilling, expectations-based value. In the case of 
exogenous influence, central bank forecasts are influencing but move private expectations 
away from the fundamental value of variables. This distinction refers to the rationale for 
publishing central bank forecasts. The core reason for publishing these forecasts is to shape 
private expectations, and section 4 attempts to shed light on this issue. However, the shaping 
of private expectations can be accomplished in various ways, and the main implication of the 
proposed distinction is to suggest that the publication of central bank forecasts stems from 
two different strategies: forecasting or policymaking. Central bank forecasts may be 
published to provide a more accurate vision of the economic outlook, or they may be used as 




In this paper, we focus on five developed countries8 for which the central bank publishes 
forecasts: Sweden, the UK, Canada, Japan and Switzerland. Some initial and general remarks 





                                                 
8 ECB is absent from this study because it started to publish its Eurosystem Staff Macroeconomic Projections only 
recently and only on a semi-annual basis. In addition, Svensson (2000, 2001) argues that these forecasts are 
inferior to those of inflation targeting central banks because they involve all national central banks, not only the 
ECB staff or the Executive Board. The Federal Reserve’s policy for data explains its absence in this comparison: 
with the five-year embargo on central bank forecasts, it is pointless to assess the potential forecasting influence of 
the Greenbook forecasts.   9 
3.1 Preliminary remarks 
First, the focus is on central banks that publish their forecasts in real time, i.e., with very 
short delays. Private agents do not always know the central bank forecast when they form 
their own forecasts, but the central bank forecast of the previous quarter is always available. 
 
Second, the private forecasts are those of the CF’s surveys. The mean of the point forecasts9 
collected are considered throughout this investigation, while individual forecasts are used 
for the robustness analysis.   
 
Third, two types of forecasts exist: the fixed-event scheme and the fixed-horizon scheme. CFs 
provide both, while the central banks of Sweden, the UK and Canada focus mostly on fixed-
horizon forecasts (however, they also publish fixed-event forecasts), and the central banks of 
Japan and Switzerland10 only publish fixed-event forecasts. Fixed-horizon forecasts have 
many advantages: they provide more observations and possibilities of comparison, and they 
are not contaminated by the effects of varying lead times. It is generally believed that fixed-
horizon forecasts are the most appropriate format to compare forecasts. Therefore, 
throughout this paper, we focus on fixed-horizon forecasts for Sweden, the UK and Canada 
and on fixed-event forecasts (for the current and future years) for Japan and Switzerland. 
 
Fourth, the sample data11 start in 1999Q3 and end12 in 2007Q4. The relatively small size of the 
time dimension of the overall sample is compensated for by the number of different forecasts 
for various horizons available for each date. Small samples lead to greater standard errors 
and because the empirical tests consist of testing whether the coefficients associated with 
central bank forecasts are positive and significant, the bias goes against the identification 
hypotheses, and the evidence supporting the hypotheses would be even more significant. 
Further details on the characteristics of each dataset are provided in Appendix A.1.  
 
Fifth, the period considered here falls within the Great Moderation period and predates the 
impact of the commodities prices’ rise and fall as well as the financial and economic crisis. It 
could then be argued that the task of forecasters was made easier during this period. 
However, even if this were true, we compare forecasters’ performances ceteris paribus. Stock 
and Watson (2007) show that this assumption is not relevant because it is very difficult to 
beat simple and naïve forecast models during periods of macroeconomic stability. Inflation 
should have become easier to forecast with the drop in volatility, but is more difficult 
because it now evolves as a random walk. Discrepancies between the private sector and the 




                                                 
9 Engelberg, Manski and Williams (2009) find point forecasts to be generally more optimistic (lower inflation and 
higher output growth) than the corresponding density forecast mean. However, Boero, Smith and Wallis (2008) 
note that analyses of errors in the density forecast mean and in point forecasts are similar. 
10 The Swiss National Bank recently started to publish fixed-horizon forecasts in addition to its fixed-event 
forecasts. Therefore, forecasts for the next twelve quarters have been available since 2008Q3. 
11 Stationary tests have been conducted for each group of series: the null hypothesis that each variable assumes a 
unit root process is always rejected at the 10% level (usually at the 5% level). The investigation is conducted with 
the Augmented Dickey-Fuller’s and Phillips and Perron’s tests. The latter proposes an alternative (nonparametric) 
method of controlling for serial correlation when testing for a unit root. These results are available upon request. 
12 We voluntarily excluded 2008-2009, during the financial and economic crisis, for which the forecasting 
performance of private forecasters has been extremely poor and whose inclusion would have automatically 
biased the results in favor of central bank forecasts. Concerning this phenomenon, Kishor (2010) shows that 
recessions favor the superiority of Greenbook forecasts when analyzing its relative forecasting performance.   10
3.2 Central bank forecasts: staff or policymakers? 
In Sweden, the UK, Canada and Switzerland, the publication of forecasts is made through 
formal Inflation Reports, while forecasts in Japan are published in the Outlook for Economic 
Activity and Prices and reflect each Policy Board member's forecast. More precisely, 
Riksbank’s forecasts are produced by the staff and revised by the Executive Board; they are a 
mix of technical and judgment approaches. The Bank of England’s forecasts are made by the 
staff and agreed upon by the Monetary Policy Committee. They note that this is not a 
mechanical exercise: they use a model to help them produce these projections, but the final 
forecast involves some judgment. In Canada, the published forecasts are staff projections and 
include a recommendation on the appropriate level of the key policy rate. Alternative 
scenarios are also provided. In Switzerland, forecasts involve staff and policymakers. Finally, 
in Japan, the forecasts that are made available to the public are those of policymakers only. 
Globally, these five central banks, which communicate their forecasts in real time, publish 
staff forecasts that are revised by policymakers in Sweden, the UK and Switzerland, staff 
forecasts in Canada and policymaker forecasts in Japan. Ellison and Sargent (2010), in 
response to Romer and Romer (2008), support the idea that policymakers’ forecasts have 
stronger strategic and policy contents than staff forecasts, which are predictions of future 
outcomes. 
 
3.3 Central bank forecasts: Which interest rate scenario? 
There are three potential scenarios on which central bank forecasts may be based: the 
constant interest rate, the interest rate expected by financial markets, and the central bank’s 
projected interest rate. The former two give rise to conditional forecasts (because they are 
conditioned on a path of interest rates that does not usually match the central bank’s 
projected interest rate), while the latter generates unconditional forecasts. By construction, 
conditional forecasts are not the best predictors of future outcomes. Moreover, it appears 
from the literature that unconditional forecasts should be preferred, as Woodford (2000) 
argues that central bank forecasting based on private expectations gives too much weight to 
forward-looking variables. Faust and Leeper (2005) show that unconditional forecasts are 
more effective communication tools than conditional forecasts. Faust and Wright (2008) 
provide specific tests for conditional forecasts and consider that these types of forecasts 
“represent a substantial impediment to the analysis of their quality”13. 
 
The Riksbank’s forecasts from Sweden were based on a constant interest rate scenario before 
October 2005 and on implicit forward rates until February 2007 (the interest rate expected by 
financial markets). Since then, the forecasts have been based on its preferred path for the 
future interest rate. The Riksbank publishes a fan chart of this projected path. The Bank of 
Canada also bases its forecasts on a projected path for its central bank rate but without 
releasing its trajectory. Forecasts in Japan and Switzerland are based on the assumption of a 
constant interest rate, while the Bank of England uses two scenarios14: a constant interest rate 
since 1993Q1 and a scenario based on the interest rate expected by markets since 1998Q1; it 
also publishes a fan chart of its projections. 
 
These differences might make forecast comparisons difficult because the last three central 
banks produce conditional forecasts (scenario of a constant interest rate), and Riksbank has 
produced this type of forecast during most of the sample period. First, this type of forecast 
                                                 
13 Other criticisms to conditional forecasts are that the procedure that is used to construct forecasts is different 
from the procedure that is actually used to determine interest rate setting to satisfy the target criterion, that 
forecasts therefore lack credibility and that constant and market interest rate scenarios are not consistent with the 
existence of a unique equilibrium in forward-looking models (Gali 2010). 
14 We report mean square forecasts errors of both scenarios but focus on the constant interest rate scenario.   11
penalizes the central bank’s forecasting performance. The purpose of this investigation is to 
underline the superiority of central bank forecasts, so the bias goes against our hypothesis, 
and the evidence supporting the hypothesis would be even more significant. More 
importantly, if the delays of transmission of monetary policy are longer than the horizons of 
the considered forecasts, then regardless of the interest rate scenario, it may be reasonably 
argued that in the end, all of these forecasts are close to being unconditional. This empirical 
analysis therefore focuses on forecast horizons from the current quarter to four quarters 
ahead, whereas conventional wisdom states that monetary policy may show its real effect at 
12 months for the GDP and between 18 and 24 months for inflation. 
 
A focus on these shorter horizons resolves another issue. The central bank has an instrument 
that gives it some control over the forecasted variables. For instance, a central bank that has a 
good ability to manage inflation through interest rate movements may therefore have a good 
forecasting record. This bias is avoided when the horizon of forecasts is shorter than the 
transmission lag of monetary policy because the central bank has no effective control on 
variables forecasted and is in a symmetric position relative to private forecasters. Central 
bank forecasts therefore represent unbiased and uncontrolled predictions of future 
evolutions of inflation and GDP, for which it seems reasonable to assume that forecasters 
seek to maximize their predictions’ accuracy. 
 
3.4 Timing issue 
The timing issue deserves some attention. Concerning the assessment of influence, we do not 
compare the forecasts within the same quarter, so the timing of publication within the 
quarter has no relevance for this specific question. The three influence tests described 
hereafter assess whether the forecasts of private agents made at quarter t-1 influence 
forecasts of the central bank made at quarter t or are the opposite. Nevertheless, as the 
second mover publishes its forecasts later, it should contain more information (second mover 
advantage), and there might be a bias to the extent that the second mover’s forecast should 
be more prone to influencing subsequent forecasts. We control for this effect in section 4. 
 
When assessing the relative forecasting performance, we compare private and central bank 
forecasts within the same quarter, but both are not produced on exactly the same date, and 
this condition favors the central bank that publishes its forecasts second. It appears that in 
the UK, Japan and Canada, the private sector is the second mover, and it benefits from an 
informational advantage. As the focus of section 5 is to determine whether the central bank 
has superior forecasting performance, this bias goes against the central bank, so evidence in 
favor of the central bank would be even more convincing15. In the case of Sweden, in two 
quarters out of four, the central bank is the second mover, and in the two others, the private 
sector is the second mover. Therefore, there is no clear second mover advantage in this 
configuration, and we control for this issue. Because no specification makes central bank and 
private forecasts exactly comparable, the assessment of forecast accuracy in both cases 
enables us to test the validity of the Swedish result by deliberately putting the Riksbank in a 
disadvantaged position and evaluating whether it still outperforms private forecasts. For 
Switzerland, the central bank is always the second mover, and evidence in this case should 
be analyzed cautiously. 
                                                 
15 An alternative argument would be that with a one- or two month-gap (for Canada and the UK, respectively), 
the central bank forecasts cannot outperform private forecasts. As shown in Table 4, the timing correction placing 
the BoC in a deliberate timing advantage does not lead to a relatively better forecasting performance of the central 
bank. The same result appears when placing the BoE in a deliberate two-month timing advantage (estimates 
available upon request). This finding confirms that the timing configuration is not responsible for the relative 
forecasting performance of these central banks.   12
4. Do Central Bank Forecasts Influence Private Forecasts? 
 
This section assesses whether central bank forecasts influence private forecasts, or from 
equation (2), whether δ is different from zero, independent of the relative forecast accuracy. 
The question of whether it is desirable for private agents to use more accurate forecasts to 
form their own expectations is beyond the focus of this paper. The focus of the following 
tests is on the influence of central banks and whether private forecasters place any weight on 
central bank forecasts. 
 
4.1 Influence test for fixed events incorporating released news 
We assess the influence of the central bank (resp. the private sector) through its forecasts for 
a given event in the determination of the private forecasts (resp. the central bank) for the same 
event but one period later.16 In other words, this test may also be interpreted as the influence 
of the central bank forecasts (resp. private) on the revision of private sector forecasts. The 
equation estimated is the following, with i being the time lag: 
11
11 1 ()α ββ β ε
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−↔ − − =+ ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ +
hh h h
tt I t t C B t P S t t CB or PS I CB PS ,                             (3) 
where 
h
t CB  is the central bank forecast made at date t for h horizons later, and
h
t PS  is the 
equivalent for the private sector. The potential influence of central bank forecasts is assessed 
regarding whether for each specification, the coefficient βCB, which is associated with the 
central bank forecast to determine the private sector (PS) forecast, is significantly different 
from zero and vice versa17.  
 
The variable It-1↔t represents the information set released between dates t-1 and t to test that 
the influence is robust to the inclusion of the news released between date t-1, when the first 
forecasts are made, and date t, when the potentially influenced forecasts are made. This 
specification with a news variable allows us to distinguish between the influence from 
previous forecasts and the influence from the news released during this time interval. The 
variable It-1↔t is constructed as the difference between the actual data in t and the forecast for 
t made in t-1, following the literature on the impact of economic news (Pearce and Roley 
(1985), McQueen and Roley (1993) and Balduzzi, Elton and Green (2001)), which assume that 
a variable of economic data announcements could be computed as the difference between 
realized values and forecasted values. 
 
Table 1 displays the benchmark influence18. For Sweden, it clearly shows for the Consumer 
Price Index (CPI) that private forecasts are never significant when the central bank forecasts 
are the dependent variable, while the latter is significant at 1% in the private sector equation. 
Concerning the GDP, there is no robust pattern to evidence central bank influence (only 
coefficients for h=0 and h=1 are significant). For the UK, it shows that for the RPIX19 and CPI-
H, there is a strong influence of the central bank because forecasts are very significant for the 
determination of private forecasts, but the inverse is not true. For the GDP, there is only 
weak evidence of central bank influence (which was not confirmed by robustness tests). For 
Canada, in the base specification (for which there is a timing advantage of 2 months for CFs), 
                                                 
16 Due to differences between the frequency of publication and the horizon of forecasts, the forecast for the next 
horizon (the next year) that is supposed to give information on the forecast for the current year is shifted back 4 
periods for Switzerland (quarterly publication) and 2 periods for Japan (biannual publication). 
17 To make sure that results are not a statistical artefact because forecasts may be highly correlated, we always 
estimate the opposite equation to estimate whether private forecasts (with respect to central bank forecasts) 
influence those of the central bank (with respect to those of the private sector). 
18 Coefficients to be compared to determine influence are highlighted in bold type in Tables 1, 2 and 3. 
19 Retail Price Index (RPI) excluding mortgage interest payments.   13
private forecasts are sometimes significant for the CPI, but the effect vanishes when the 
timing correction specification is considered. There is no regular pattern that shows an 
influence from either side. For Japan, the outcomes are straightforward. Regardless of the 
forecasts for the CPI or GDP, the BoJ influences the private sector. These results are 
consistent with those of Fujiwara (2005). For Switzerland, this baseline estimation shows the 
influence of central bank forecasts but is not robust to complementary tests, as shown later. 
 
One additional striking result is noteworthy: while in all countries except for the UK, private 
agents form their forecasts on the basis of the new information set released, private agents in 
the UK only consider central bank forecasts and do not use new information released during 
the interval of time between t-1 and t. This finding suggests inefficient forecasting by private 
forecasters and somehow high credibility of the Bank of England. 
 
4.2 Robustness analysis 
First and foremost, small sample biases go against the estimation of the coefficients of central 
bank influence by increasing standard errors. In addition, to oppose the possibility that 
samples drawn from the same overall population would give different estimates, estimates 
are always provided for different horizons. If the same result appears for all horizons, we 
consider that the estimation of coefficients is not biased by sampling variability issues. We 
assume an outcome is robust when a pattern with similar results is evidenced for many 
horizons. 
 
Two complementary tests20 assess the robustness of the benchmark estimation: an influence 
test at fixed horizons and an influence test for fixed events with no news variable. The 
influence test at fixed horizons corresponds to a standard test of Granger-causality between 
private and central bank forecasts:  
11 ()α ββε −− = +⋅ +⋅ +
hh h h
tt C B t P S t t CB or PS CB PS                                         (4) 
We test the hypothesis that central bank forecasts are significantly different from zero in the 
private forecast equation and not the opposite. While this test compares forecasts at the same 
horizon, for which there is a weak practical rationale that forecasts for the current (or next) 
quarter are influenced by forecasts on the previous date for the same horizon, this test is 
theoretically consistent because agents are supposed to incorporate all of the information 
available at date t in their decision-making process.  
 
The influence test for fixed events with no news variable is extended to additional horizons h 
at lags i to assess the robustness of the results concerning the timing issue: 
()α ββε
++
−− = +⋅ +⋅ +
h h hi hi
tt C B t i P S t i t CB or PS CB PS                                          (5) 
 
Table 2 presents the estimates of the influence test at fixed horizons, while Table 3 shows the 
influence test for fixed events with no news variable. The results are strongly confirmed for 
three central banks: the Riksbank (for the CPI), the Bank of England (for the RPIX and CPI-
H) and the Bank of Japan (for the CPI and GDP). The forecasts of these central banks are 
always very significant to determine subsequent private forecasts. 
 
In general, it is worth noting that influence is more significant from the nearest forecasts 
(those made in t-1 and t-2), consistent with the hypothesis that agents form expectations with 
the largest and most recent set of information. Moreover, influence is more significant for 
                                                 
20 Estimates are only shown for the CPI in Sweden, the RPIX and CPI in the UK and the CPI and GDP in Japan, 
for which the benchmark estimation show evidence of influence. All other tables of these two tests are available 
upon request.   14
forecasts at very short horizons. Finally, evidence of some influencing ability of GDP 
forecasts is weak (except for the case of Japan). The latter two results seem to be related to 
the greater uncertainty of forecasting at long horizons or forecasting the GDP. 
 
Concerning the timing issue, in the UK and Japan, the private sector is the second mover and 
has an informational advantage. In these cases, a bias should favor private sector forecasts to 
influence those of the central bank. The fact that there is no evidence of influence of private 
forecasts and robust evidence of central bank influence acts like a control for first/second 
mover effects and confirms the robustness of the results. In the case of Sweden, there is no 
clear second mover effect because the central bank and the private sector play each role half 
of the time, so the estimations should not be biased by this effect. However, as shown in 
Table 3, when one considers different previous quarters t-1, t-2, t-3 or t-4, which represent a 
mix of cases where either the central bank is the second mover or the private sector is the 
second mover, the influence of central bank forecasts always remains significant, while there 
is no evidence in favor of private forecasts. 
 
4.3 Discussion 
The cases of Sweden, the UK and Japan provide evidence of the influence of central bank 
forecasts on private forecasts, mainly through inflation forecasts, while in Canada and 
Switzerland, there is no evidence of central bank influence. In other words, in the former 
three countries, central bank forecasts induce future revisions of private forecasts. The 
private sector revises its forecasts to bring them in line with central bank forecasts. These 
estimates provide original empirical evidence on the influencing capacity of central bank 
forecasts on private forecasts, which is a key issue for policymakers, and constitute empirical 
support for the wide theoretical literature that states that monetary policy is about managing 
private expectations. Moreover, regarding the literature on the direction of the leader-
follower scheme of monetary policy, there is no clear empirical support for the influence of 
private forecasts on central bank forecasts. This does not mean that policymakers do not pay 
attention to private expectations or that monetary policy is not influenced by private 
expectations, but it suggests that central bank forecasts are not influenced in this way. 
 
5. Sources of Influence: the forecasting performance hypothesis 
 
This section assesses whether central banks produce better forecasts (from section 2, whether 
σCB  <  σPS) using two methods: unconditional comparisons with Mean Square Errors and 
conditional comparisons through regressions along the lines of Nelson (1972), Cooper and 
Nelson (1975), Fair and Shiller (1989, 1990) and Romer and Romer (2000). We provide results 
for both methods for all five countries and present the results of robustness tests21 when 
benchmark estimates provide evidence of superior forecasting performance, as in the case of 
Sweden.  
 
The analysis of the relative forecasting performance of central banks compared to the private 
sector22 started with the seminal work of Romer and Romer (2000), who found that 
Greenbook forecasts are more accurate than private forecasts23. Outside the US, few studies 
                                                 
21 Robustness tests for other countries are available upon request. 
22 Another recent strand of the literature compares the DSGE forecasting performance to either central bank 
forecasts or private ones: Smets and Wouters (2004), Lees, Matheson and Smith (2007), Edge, Kiley and Laforte 
(2010), Christoffel, Coenen and Warne (2010), Wieland and Wolters (2010) and Edge and Gürkaynak (2010). 
23 Gavin and Mandal (2001), Sims (2002) and Peek, Rosengren and Tootell (1998, 2003) supported this analysis. 
D’Agostino and Whelan (2008) and Gamber and Smith (2009) found that this advantage decreased recently, while   15
have assessed the relative forecasting performance of the central bank and the private sector. 
In the UK, Boero, Smith and Wallis (2008) analyzed the Survey of External Forecasters (SEF) 
and found that its average point inflation forecasts outperform the Monetary Policy 
Committee’s forecasts. They noted that the SEF’s error is smaller than any (regular) 
individual errors, supporting pooled surveys. Casillas-Olvera and Bessler (2006) found a 
similar result with density forecasts24. Finally, Andersson et al. (2007) showed that inflation 
forecasts of the central bank of Sweden25 are more accurate than those from other institutions 
and simple statistical models. To my knowledge, there is no other empirical assessment of 
the relative forecasting performance of the central bank with that of the private sector. 
 
5.1 Unconditional Comparisons: Mean Square Errors 
The simplest method to compare forecast accuracy is to measure Mean Square Errors, which 
constitute unconditional comparisons. One advantage of this method is to be the most 
neutral or uncontroversial method. To calculate the p-value for the test of the null hypothesis 
that central banks and private forecasts MSEs are equal, we follow Romer and Romer (2000) 
and estimate this equation: 
22 () ()
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th t th t t YC B YP S α ε ++ −− −= + ,                                                (6) 
where  + th Y  is the actual value of inflation or GDP growth, 
h
t CB  is the central bank forecast 
made at date t for h horizons later,
h
t PS  the equivalent for the private sector, and α is the 
difference between the squared errors of forecasts of both actors. It allows the calculation of 
the standard errors for α,  corrected for serial correlation with the Newey-West HAC 
method26. Robust p-values can be obtained for testing the null hypothesis that α = 0 and 
determine whether forecast errors are significantly different. 
 
5.2 Conditional Comparisons: Regressions 
The second method consists of a regression of the actual variables on both central bank and 
private forecasts to assess whether some forecasts contain useful information to predict 
future realized values. This method is applied from Nelson (1972), Cooper and Nelson 
(1975), Fair and Shiller (1989, 1990) and Romer and Romer (2000) to quantify the marginal 
contribution of one forecast compared to another and assess to what extent knowing one of 
the forecasts enables the production of better forecasts. The estimated equation is: 
hh
th C B t P S t t YC B P S α ββε + = +⋅+⋅+                                                 (7) 
We test the hypothesis that central bank forecasts contain useful information if its associated 
coefficient  βCB is significantly different from zero and contain additional information 
compared to private forecasts if βCB is superior to βPS and is close to a value of one. Standard 
errors are also computed using Newey-West’s HAC method to correct for serial correlation. 
                                                                                                                                                         
Joutz and Stekler (2000), Atkeson and Ohanian (2001), Faust, Swanson and Wright (2004), Baghestani (2008) and, 
to a lesser extent, Amornthum (2006), arrived at a different conclusion. Gavin and Mandal (2001) and Romer and 
Romer (2008) compared Greenbook forecasts (from the Federal Reserve staff) to Federal Open Market Committee 
(FOMC) forecasts, which are policymakers’ forecasts. It appears that Greenbook forecasts outperform FOMC 
forecasts. 
24 Groen, Kapetanios and Price (2008) compared Bank of England (BoE) forecasts to real-time model forecasts but 
not to private forecasts. They found that simple univariate models perform better than BoE’s GDP forecasts, while 
inflation forecasts of the BoE are strongly dominant. 
25 Adolfson et al. (2007) compare the forecasting performance of the Riksbank to that of the BVAR and DSGE 
models. The latter appear to outperform the former. 
26 In these regressions, the problem due to the correlation between forecast errors leads to the calculation of 
robust standard errors to serial correlation. When forecasts for four quarters ahead miss an unexpected change in 
the variable, there would cause forecast errors all in the same direction. Forecasts are then declared serially 
correlated. To deal with this problem, when considering forecasts for inflation h quarters ahead, the standard 
errors are computed by correcting for heteroskedasticity and serial correlation according to the Newey and 
West’s HAC Consistent Covariances method.   16
 
Unconditional comparisons test which forecast is more accurate, while conditional 
comparisons test which forecast gives more information to correctly predict future variables 
given multiple forecasts. Because the focus of this section is on the relative performance 
rather than the absolute performance, and the focus of this paper is on the interaction 
between central bank forecasts and private forecasts, the analysis focuses on conditional 
comparisons. Moreover, the overall sample corresponds to the Great Moderation period. 
Therefore, significant evidence would be even more noteworthy because inflation and the 
GDP growth rate have been extremely stable in this sample. Finally, there is no credibility 
issue for the central banks considered here and no particular decisions that could favor 
central banks to the detriment of the private sector (Atkeson and Ohanian (2001) argue that 
private agents’ view that the Federal Reserve will not succeed in fighting strong inflation in 
the beginning of the 1980s favored its relative forecasting performance). 
 
5.3 Benchmark Results 
Table 4 displays Mean Square Errors, and Table 5 displays regressions similar to Romer and 
Romer (2000). For Sweden, Riksbank’s inflation forecast errors are smaller than those of the 
private sector but are similar for the GDP. Regressions confirm these findings for the CPI, 
while the evidence for the GDP is mixed and not robust, with the presence of a significant 
negative coefficient. This finding is probably due to the correlation between the two 
forecasts, and a robustness test is performed to confirm that this issue does not bias inflation 
estimates. 
For the UK, forecast errors are globally very similar and not significantly different for 
inflation or the GDP. One can only note that for inflation at long horizons27 (Q+4, Q+6), 
private forecasters have very little advantage over the Bank of England (BoE). This finding 
might be explained by the timing advantage of private agents. Regressions do not show 
evidence of superior forecasting performance. For Canada, one must keep in mind that the 
private sector benefits from a strong timing advantage. CFs produce slightly better forecasts 
at short horizons (current quarter and Q+1), but there is equivalent accuracy at longer 
horizons for both the CPI and GDP. The regression analysis shows that private forecasts 
have a weak advantage on short horizons (which is more visible for the GDP) with the base 
timing, while with the timing correction, there is no evidence of better forecasting 
performance in any case. For Japan, the results do not provide a regular pattern, and there is 
no evidence of superior forecasting performance. For Switzerland, there is no evidence of 
better forecasting performance of the central bank, especially given that the central bank is 
the second mover. 
 
5.4 Robustness Analysis28 
We assess the validity of the main positive outcome and test whether the superior 
forecasting performance of the central bank of Sweden is robust to the following: 
(i)  multicollinearity, following Granger and Newbold (1977), as central bank and 
private forecasts are correlated;  
(ii)  the inclusion of an autoregressive term of the dependent variable to assess whether 
central bank forecasts provide additional forward-looking information;  
(iii)  the partition of the sample between upward and downward economic phases 
because forecasts are usually known to have mean reversion properties (see, among others, 
Fama and Bliss (1987), Kim, Nelson and Startz (1991) and Kilian and Taylor (2003)) and fail 
                                                 
27 This result is confirmed at the two-year horizon by the SEF. This table is available upon request. 
28 We only provide robustness tests for Sweden to confirm the superior forecasting performance of the Riksbank. 
For the other countries, these robustness tests are available upon request.   17
to forecast turning points (see Neftci (1982), Diebold and Rudebusch (1989), Hamilton (1989) 
and Lahiri and Wang (1994)). The first property could lead to a bias in the benchmark 
regression because the projections are underestimated in the upward phases and 
overestimated in the downward phases, while the second property shows large forecast 
errors when a turning point occurs;  
(iv)  the second mover informational advantage, as in the case of Sweden, where there is 
no clear second mover advantage: the central bank publishes its forecasts after the private 
sector in March and October and the private sector after the central bank in June and 
December;  
(v)  a comparison with individual forecasters composing the surveys of CFs, as Kim, 
Lim and Shaw (2001) show that surveys do not completely capture the full set of new 
information available to the pool of individual forecasts and therefore tend to reveal 
inefficiency;  
(vi)  another private forecast dataset by Prospera AB.  
These tests are described in detail in Appendix A.2. These robustness tests confirm that the 
Riksbank’s inflation forecasts are more accurate than private forecasts. All of the estimates 
are presented in Appendix A.329. In addition to the robustness tests presented above, the 
figures of Appendix A.4 present the absolute forecasting errors across time of the Riksbank 
and CFs for the five horizons considered. Those graphs visually confirm the fact that 
inflation forecast errors are smaller throughout the sample. Private forecasts are generally 
worse, and the superiority of the Riksbank is not due to particular episodes or outliers30. 
 
5.5 The Swedish Puzzle 
The better forecasting performance of the Riksbank may be considered as a puzzle, as 
forecasts are communicated to private agents and central bank information is therefore 
public. A different current-quarter forecast accuracy is justified because private agents and 
the central bank have different sets of information. However, for next-quarter forecasts, 
private agents should use published information. However, estimates show better 
forecasting performance for every horizon.  
We test three hypotheses to explain this puzzle: (i) the low credibility of the central bank, 
which tempers private agents to use central bank forecasts; (ii) private agents’ inability to 
extract information contained in central bank forecasts, either because these forecasts are 
considered as a black box or because of the large amount of data received by private agents, 
which they are unable to deal with; and (iii) the gathering of new information between each 
forecast’s release by the central bank, which constitutes a new private information set. 
The first argument is refuted by the influence of the Riksbank’s inflation forecasts on private 
agents. We then test whether the private sector is able to incorporate either information 
released by the central bank’s forecast or new information revealed between t-1 and t by 
estimating equation (7) with a timing advantage for the private sector: 
1
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29 In Table A.i, the R² of the univariate regressions shows a higher predictive power of the Riksbank’s inflation 
forecasts. Table A.ii shows that the Riksbank’s inflation forecasts are still significant and provide marginal 
forward-looking information when adding a lagged dependent term. Table A.iii confirms the main result when 
the sample is divided according to economic phases. Table A.iv focuses on the second mover informational 
advantage and shows that the central bank outperforms the private sector across both sets of results. Individual 
forecasts from Table A.v confirm that the superiority of the Riksbank is not only over the mean of the CF’s 
respondents but also over each individual respondent. Finally, when comparing the Riksbank forecasts with 
Prospera AB’s survey in Table A.vi, the CPI forecasts’ errors of the central bank are lower than those from all 
respondents and are only similar to those from money market players at the two-year horizon. 
30 The equivalent graphs for other countries confirm the outcome that neither the central bank nor private agents 
have more accurate forecasts and are available upon request.   18
Table A.vii in Appendix A.5 exhibits significant βPS and insignificant βCB, which invalidates 
the hypothesis of low information processing and extraction capacity of private agents and 
so invalidates the second argument. Moreover, the previous section shows that private 
forecasts are influenced by central bank forecasts and confirms that private agents can 
extract information from central bank forecasts.  
By the process of elimination, this analysis suggests that the superior inflation forecasts of 
the Riksbank stems from some expertise in gathering new private information (or a better 
use and information extraction of public data) between each forecast31. Therefore, the puzzle 
vanishes: if the central bank is better at collecting and analyzing data than private agents, it 
will update its forecasts for all horizons and continue to outperform private agents despite 
making its information public.  
 
5.6 Discussion 
This section provides evidence that the Riksbank’s inflation forecasts outperform private 
forecasts. There is no evidence of any advantage for Canada and Japan, whereas for the UK 
and Switzerland, the evidence is mixed, and private agents seem to have slightly better 
inflation forecasts for long and short horizons, respectively. This finding is consistent with 
Boero, Smith and Wallis (2008), who showed that private inflation forecasts outperform BoE 
forecasts at long horizons. In general, the relatively good forecasting performance of surveys 
legitimizes the choice to consider them as proxies of private forecasts32. Moreover, Blix, 
Wadefjord, Wienecke and Adahl (2001) made a comprehensive study on the forecasting 
performances of 250 major institutions and found, among other patterns, that growth is more 
difficult to forecast than inflation. This result was confirmed for 4 out of 5 analyzed 
countries, with the central bank and private agents in Canada having a better record for GDP 
forecasts. Finally, D’Agostino and Whelan (2008) and Gamber and Smith (2009) found less 
evidence of Greenbook superiority in the US during small and recent stable samples. The fact 
that the result by Romer and Romer (2000) was dampened during short and recent samples 
reinforces the findings of the Riksbank’s superior forecasts on the short and stable sample of 
the 2000s. 
 
Concerning the possible sources of superior forecasting performance, Sims (2002) proposed 
three hypotheses: the central bank makes better use of the same public data, collects better 
data, and/or exploits its private and prior knowledge of its future policy decisions. 
Concerning the last proposition, which is favored by Sims, two arguments can be put 
forward. First, the forecast horizons considered here are shorter than the transmission lag of 
monetary policy. Second, the constant interest rate scenario unfavorably biases the 
forecasting performance of central banks. It might be argued that central banks base their 
forecasts on interest rates that are constant or expected by markets precisely to avoid 
revealing their private information about future policy paths, but this action decreases their 
forecasting performance. In this study, prior knowledge does not lead to better forecasting 
performance for 4 out of 5 central banks. The only central bank that experiences a 
significantly better forecasting performance, the Riksbank, publishes explicit interest rate 
paths33 and so makes this information public. In a similar vein, the results by Romer and 
                                                 
31 The idea that the central bank is always one step ahead and the private forecasters never catch up is confirmed 
by Table A.ii of Appendix A.3: each new forecast release comprises a substantial proportion of new information 
that is not predictable knowing the previous information set (or previous central bank forecast). 
32 One might even consider that the respondents of these surveys are generally better informed agents through a 
selection bias. This consideration reinforces the use of these surveys when assessing relative forecasting 
performance with respect to the central bank.  
33 One can wonder whether the Riksbank delivers relevant and private information to the public through its 
interest rate path projections, as they generally differ from realizations (Svensson (2009)).   19
Romer (2000) suggest that the Federal Reserve forecasts’ release with a 5-year lag enhances 
its relative information set. However, the Riksbank’s transparency example suggests that this 
is not a sufficient condition. Estimates of subsection 5.5 suggest that the Riksbank is able to 
collect better data or extract information from public data, which is the source of its more 
accurate inflation forecasts. 
 
Going back to the sources of central bank influence, it is noteworthy that the absence of 
evidence of more accurate central bank forecasts in Canada and Switzerland is consistent 
with the lack of evidence of central bank influence. Second, despite the statistical and 
econometric caveats and according to the identifying assumption that if central bank forecasts 
influence private forecasts but are not more accurate, then their influence stems from central bank 
signals either on future policy or private information, these results suggest that central banks of 
the UK and Japan may experience exogenous influences. Third, the simultaneous evidence of 
influence and superior forecasting performance suggests that the central bank of Sweden 
might experience endogenous influences. The next section aims to test whether the central 
bank’s influence in Sweden is conditional on its forecasting ability.  
 
6. Testing for Endogenous Influence in Sweden 
 
The third step of this study is to assess the causal relationship between superior forecasting 
performance and the influence defining the concept of endogenous influence. We test 
whether a relatively better forecasting record enables central bank influence to evidence the 
specific weight placed on central bank forecasts when those forecasts are more accurate. The 
alternative hypothesis is that influence is independent of forecasting performance.  
 
We estimate the two following equations, for which the common idea is to assess whether 
the influence of central bank forecasts depends on its past relative accuracy: 
hh h h h
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The RFP (Relative Forecasting Performance) variable is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 
when the central bank has a better forecasting accuracy compared to private forecasters, i.e., 
∆RMSE(Ft-1) > 0, and a value of 0 when the central bank has a lower or equivalent forecasting 
accuracy compared to private agents. The ∆RMSE(Ft-1) variable corresponds to the difference 
between both average absolute forecast errors of the central bank and CFs whose horizons 
were t-1, that is to say, the forecast made at t-5 at the horizon h=4, the forecast made at t-4 at 
the horizon h=3 a n d  s o  o n  u n t i l  t h e  f o r e c a s t  m a d e  a t  t-1 for the current horizon. The 
∆RMSE(Ft-1) variable represents the relative forecasting performance at a given date. A 
positive  ∆RMSE(Ft-1) means the central bank made smaller forecast errors for t-1. This 
variable goes from -0.35 to 0.61, with a mean of 0.10 and a median of 0.08. Those values are 
consistent with the relative forecasting performance analysis of section 5 for Sweden. In both 
regressions, it is as if private agents know the relative forecasting performance of the central 
bank at t-1 and use it to disentangle between forecasts made at t-1 when forming their 
forecasts at t. 
 
Because of the interaction term, the purpose of equation (9) is to assess whether the effect of 
central bank forecasts on private forecasts depends on the relative forecasting performance 
of the central bank. βCB indicates the effect of central bank forecasts on private forecasts when 
central bank forecasts are not superior (RFP=0), βCB.RFP  indicates the effect of central bank   20
forecasts on private forecasts when central bank forecasts are superior (RFP=1), and βCB + 
βCB.RFP indicates the total influence of central bank forecasts. The significance level of the 
interaction term designates whether βCB.RFP is different from βCB but not from zero. 
 
The purpose of equation (10), a split sample regression, is to confirm the interaction term 
regression by comparing the values of βCB associated with central bank forecasts made at t-1 
when the central bank has either superior or inferior forecasting performance. Sample sizes 
become smaller than in equation (9) by construction, but the bias always goes against our 
hypothesis. 
 
Table 6 presents the results of both series of estimation. For the two shorter horizons, the 
results clearly show that central bank forecasts influence private forecasts only when they are 
superior. In the left column, the interaction term regression exhibits a non-significant βCB (no 
influence when central bank forecasting performance is not superior) and a significant βCB.RFP, 
which highlights that the effect of central bank forecasts on private forecasts (central bank 
influence) depends on the relative forecasting performance of the central bank. The right 
column for the split sample approach confirms that when previous central bank forecasts are 
superior, central bank forecasts are significant. For longer horizons, the coefficients 
associated with central bank forecasts are similar regardless of the forecasting performance 
of the central bank. Two interpretations of this outcome are possible: first, for long horizons, 
when the uncertainty is greater, the reputation of the central bank and the effect of its 
superior forecasts show some hysteresis; and second, forecasts of a central bank that 
experiences endogenous influence may also comprise policy signals and/or central bank 
information.  
 
This section shows that a relatively better forecasting record generates a specific central bank 
influence at short horizons and suggests that there is a causal relationship between 
forecasting performance and influence, which defines the concept of endogenous influence. 
Therefore, the proposed distinction between the two sources of central bank influence 




This paper provides original empirical evidence on the ability of central bank forecasts to 
influence private forecasts. We find that in three of five countries for which central banks 
publish their forecasts in real time (Sweden, the UK and Japan), central bank inflation 
forecasts influence private forecasts, while in Canada and Switzerland, there is no evidence 
of such an influence. We find that the opposite is never true. To disentangle the possible 
sources of central bank influence, we propose the concepts of endogenous and exogenous 
influence, for which influence stems from superior forecasting performance and signals, 
respectively. The second step of this paper is to provide an empirical assessment of the 
relative forecasting performance of central banks and private agents in these five countries. 
We find that the Riksbank has more accurate inflation forecasts and seems to benefit from a 
specific expertise to constitute new private information between each forecast’s release. 
Third, we find that relatively better forecasting performance generates specific central bank 
influence.  
 
At the level of aggregate dynamics stabilization, the proposed distinction on the sources of 
central bank influence is important because it would enable the differentiation of influence 
moving private expectations toward the fundamental value of future variables from the   21
opposite: a self-fulfilling, expectations-based value. A second implication, which is more 
policy oriented, is that the shaping of private expectations that can be accomplished through 
the publication of central bank macroeconomic forecasts may stem from two different central 
banking strategies: forecasting or policymaking. Central bank forecasts may be published to 
give a more accurate vision of the economic o u t l o o k ,  o r  t h e y  m a y  b e  u s e d  a s  t o o l s  b y  
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t-1 0.749*** 0.430** 0.597 0.370
(0.227) (0.113) (0.362) (0.111) (0.342) (0.242) (0.300) (0.220) (0.186) (0.173) (0.365) (0.354) (0.177) (0.250) (0.181) (0.158) (0.459) (0.479)
PS
h
t-1 -0.321 0.128 -0.473 0.239 PS
h
t-1 -0.476 -0.342 0.577 0.039 -0.163 0.485*** PS
h
t-1 1.021** 0.675 1.118*** 0.946** PS
h
t-2 -0.501**-0.814*** -0.293 -0.644
(0.215) (0.127) (0.414) (0.235) (0.370) (0.249) (0.454) (0.373) (0.235) (0.170) (0.450) (0.435) (0.314) (0.307) (0.229) (0.215) (0.481) (0.566)







t-1 0.943***0.455***0.898*** 0.198 CB
h
t-1 0.940***0.896*** 0.431 0.718***0.570*** 0.008 CB
h
t-1 -0.365* -0.080 0.728 0.354 CB
h
t-1 0.239 0.462*** 1.038** 0.903*** CB
h
t-1 0.060 0.162
(0.317) (0.123) (0.263) (0.140) (0.247) (0.193) (0.330) (0.173) (0.157) (0.116) (0.186) (0.164) (0.433) (0.525) (0.280) (0.099) (0.305) (0.191) (0.203) (0.176)
PS
h
t-1 -0.326 0.223 -0.688* 0.321 PS
h
t-1 -0.463 -0.678** 0.374 -0.091 -0.128 0.545*** PS
h
t-1 0.924*** 0.232 0.064 0.049 PS
h
t-2 -0.018 -0.834*** -0.341 -0.7445* PS
h
t-1 0.712***0.604***
(0.314) (0.144) (0.380) (0.317) (0.274) (0.289) (0.482) (0.260) (0.226) (0.140) (0.273) (0.238) (0.331) (0.348) (0.259) (0.254) (0.358) (0.357) (0.142) (0.136)
R² 0.42 0.57 0.41 0.45 R² 0.47 0.62 0.44 0.56 0.33 0.35 R² 0.36 0.03 0.36 0.09 R² 0.06 0.49 0.53 0.47 R² 0.67 0.65
CB
h
t-1 0.789** 0.348*** 0.645** 0.078 CB
h
t-1 0.745***0.321*** 0.626 0.847** 0.502*** -0.109 CB
h
t-1 0.170 -0.260 0.451* 0.104 CB
h
t-1 0.260 0.315 0.885 1.092 CB
h
t-1 1.016*** 0.427**
(0.317) (0.096) (0.282) (0.144) (0.199) (0.076) (0.398) (0.291) (0.146) (0.071) (0.197) (0.224) (0.218) (0.235) (0.313) (0.263) (0.547) (0.627) (0.310) (0.194)
PS
h
t-1 -0.155 0.308** -0.523 0.263 PS
h
t-1 -0.319 -0.151 -0.128 -0.610 -0.009 0.558*** PS
h
t-1 0.528** 0.536*** 1.169** 1.120 PS
h
t-2 0.258 -0.545* -0.147 -1.501 PS
h
t-1 -0.727** -0.132
(0.327) (0.126) (0.521) (0.338) (0.714) (0.192) (0.969) (0.744) (0.264) (0.172) (0.197) (0.177) (0.363) (0.698) (0.345) (0.303) (1.255) (1.265) (0.341) (0.292)
R² 0.38 0.55 0.32 0.13 R² 0.41 0.52 0.23 0.39 0.27 0.27 R² 0.43 0.18 0.76 0.46 R² 0.24 0.18 0.55 0.44 R² 0.45 0.38
CB
h
t-1 0.799*** 0.159** 0.697*** 0.095 CB
h
t-1 0.469** 0.069 1.546***1.732***0.452***-0.152*** CB
h
t-1 0.665*** 0.154 -0.667 -0.194 CB
h
t-1 0.645 0.174 0.188 0.000
(0.151) (0.074) (0.224) (0.148) (0.174) (0.085) (0.346) (0.275) (0.162) (0.047) (0.196) (0.140) (0.565) (0.126) (0.209) (0.144) (0.439) (0.206)
PS
h
t-1 -0.031 0.637*** -0.687 0.239 PS
h
t-1 -0.336 0.281 -2.383*-2.983*** 0.019 0.721*** PS
h
t-1 0.058 0.120 3.667 0.968 PS
h
t-2 -0.323 -0.657** 0.625 0.500
(0.199) (0.139) (0.634) (0.276) (0.657) (0.204) (1.108) (0.855) (0.317) (0.240) (0.253) (0.253) (1.916) (0.459) (0.401) (0.243) (1.446) (0.865)
R² 0.54 0.53 0.37 0.12 R² 0.20 0.13 0.26 0.36 0.21 0.43 R² 0.49 0.06 0.66 0.39 R² 0.49 0.38 0.16 0.11
Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors. *,**,*** means respectively significant at 10%, 5% and 1%.
CB
h
t the forecast made by the central bank in date t for h horizons later and PS
h
t by the private sector in date t for h horizons later




SWEDEN UNITED KINGDOM CANADA JAPAN
CPI GDP
h=0 h=0
h=4 h=4 h=4 h=4
h=2 h=2 h=2 h=2
h=0 h=0
h=1 h=1 h=1 h=1
h=0
Base - 2months gap Timing Correction - 1month gap
CPI GDP CPI GDP


























































t-1 0.873*** 0.605*** CB
2
t-1 0.934*** 0.451*** CB
3
t-1 1.261*** 0.645*** CB
1
t-1 1.060** 0.864*** 0.246 0.574** CB
2
t-1 1.265*** 0.941*** 0.722 0.754*** CB
3
t-1 0.976*** 0.715*** 0.503** 0.504***
(0.239) (0.128) (0.259) (0.079) (0.179) (0.059) (0.366) (0.284) (0.300) (0.220) (0.198) (0.177) (0.417) (0.214) (0.207) (0.147) (0.213) (0.131)
PS
1
t-1 0.202 0.467*** PS
2
t-1 0.119 0.630*** PS
3
t-1 -0.265 0.409*** PS
1
t-1 -0.205 0.036 0.577 0.039 PS
2
t-1 -0.602** -0.256 -0.100 -0.202 PS
3
t-1 -0.444 -0.417 0.258 0.190
(0.241) (0.136) (0.285) (0.092) (0.190) (0.130) (0.430) (0.348) (0.454) (0.373) (0.244) (0.253) (0.538) (0.255) (0.656) (0.647) (0.319) (0.174)
R² 0.79 0.86 R² 0.72 0.80 R² 0.71 0.77 R² 0.63 0.80 0.62 0.62 R² 0.75 0.82 0.58 0.70 R² 0.57 0.54 0.47 0.58
CB
2
t-2 1.074*** 0.507*** CB
3
t-2 0.850*** 0.716*** CB
4
t-2 1.324*** 0.670*** CB
2
t-2 0.597* 0.856*** 0.299 -0.044 CB
3
t-2 0.740*** 0.707*** 0.236 -0.182 CB
4
t-2 0.322 0.332** -0.775 -1.003**
(0.353) (0.172) (0.239) (0.171) (0.347) (0.175) (0.334) (0.231) (0.371) (0.525) (0.242) (0.212) (0.347) (0.315) (0.211) (0.148) (0.697) (0.318)
PS
2
t-2 0.035 0.665*** PS
3
t-2 0.471 0.523* PS
4
t-2 0.120 0.639** PS
2
t-2 0.405 -0.106 0.552 0.732 PS
3
t-2 -0.328 -0.664 0.515 0.999 PS
4
t-2 -1.690* -1.140* 2.565 2.572**
(0.388) (0.209) (0.288) (0.256) (0.343) (0.262) (0.415) (0.324) (0.638) (0.911) (0.744) (0.549) (0.915) (0.654) (0.819) (0.640) (2.203) (0.872)
R² 0.63 0.68 R² 0.48 0.58 R² 0.47 0.47 R² 0.43 0.52 0.47 0.34 R² 0.28 0.36 0.23 0.26 R² 0.24 0.26 0.20 0.25
CB
3
t-3 0.956*** 0.725*** CB
4
t-3 1.064*** 0.812*** CB
3
t-3 0.597* 0.585* -0.160 -0.044 CB
4
t-3 0.238 0.174 -1.025 -0.898
(0.270) (0.155) (0.368) (0.232) (0.299) (0.289) (0.296) (0.291) (0.309) (0.201) (1.027) (0.859)
PS
3
t-3 0.439 0.690** PS
4
t-3 0.674 0.656* PS
3
t-3 -0.072 -0.505 1.762** 1.016 PS
4
t-3 -1.209 -1.420** 3.135 1.800
(0.349) (0.266) (0.478) (0.362) (0.723) (0.640) (0.540) (0.760) (0.835) (0.555) (2.251) (2.351)












t-4 0.998** 0.945** CB
4
t-4 0.054 0.176 0.307 -0.223 CB
h+1
t-1 1.651*** 0.769*** 1.538** 1.212**
(0.469) (0.371) (0.502) (0.398) (2.031) (1.257) (0.473) (0.219) (0.604) (0.488)
PS
4
t-4 0.349 0.591 PS
4
t-4 -0.867 -0.743 -1.161 -0.256 PS
h+1
t-1 -0.985 -0.007 -0.598 0.054
(0.539) (0.447) (1.039) (0.795) (5.726) (3.646) (0.556) (0.266) (0.484) (0.403)
R² 0.26 0.32 R² 0.03 0.04 0.01 0.06 R² 0.86 0.88 0.65 0.75
Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors. *,**,*** means respectively significant at 10%, 5% and 1%.
CB
h
t the forecast made by the central bank in date t for h horizons later and PS
h
t by the private sector in date t for h horizons later
GDP
JAPAN
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Riksbank CF p-value BoE - CIR BoE - MIR CF p-value BoC CF p-value BoJ CF p-value BNS CF p-value
Current 0.05 0.12 0.00 Current 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.46 Current 0.38 0.22 0.05 Curr. Year 0.039 0.036 0.876 Curr. Year 0.027 0.019 0.077
Q+1 0.21 0.27 0.18 Q+1 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.89 Q+1 0.43 0.34 0.17 Next Year 0.162 0.103 0.251 Next Year 0.250 0.124 0.044
Q+2 0.32 0.44 0.18 Q+2 0.10 0.10 0.11 0.78 Q+2 0.65 0.40 0.07
Q+3 0.46 0.67 0.14 Q+3 0.14 0.14 0.13 0.80 Q+3 0.48 0.45 0.71
Q+4 0.57 0.86 0.20 Q+4 0.14 0.14 0.15 0.96 Q+4 0.46 0.46 0.98
Q+5 0.80 1.05 0.23 Q+5 0.17 0.18 0.15 0.67
Q+6 0.99 1.43 0.08 Q+6 0.24 0.25 0.17 0.11
BoE - CIR BoE - MIR CF p-value
Current 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.97
Q+1 0.13 0.13 0.15 0.51
Q+2 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.95
Q+3 0.26 0.25 0.25 0.93
Q+4 0.47 0.46 0.40 0.04
Q+5 0.62 0.57 0.48 0.11
Q+6 0.59 0.53 0.56 0.05
Riksbank CF p-value BoE - CIR BoE - MIR CF p-value BoC CF p-value BoJ CF p-value
Current 0.67 0.60 0.69 Current 0.57 0.58 0.68 0.38 Current 0.17 0.10 0.03 Curr. Year 0.364 0.674 0.052
Q+1 0.80 0.87 0.77 Q+1 0.65 0.65 0.78 0.37 Q+1 0.36 0.14 0.01 Next Year 0.313 0.509 0.473
Q+2 0.93 0.96 0.92 Q+2 0.71 0.71 0.87 0.36 Q+2 0.34 0.33 0.83
Q+3 0.71 0.95 0.39 Q+3 0.75 0.74 0.84 0.67 Q+3 0.30 0.34 0.75
Q+4 0.68 1.03 0.25 Q+4 0.56 0.54 0.64 0.67 Q+4 0.25 0.19 0.32
Q+5 0.60 1.11 0.11 Q+5 0.41 0.38 0.50 0.54
Q+6 0.63 1.19 0.04 Q+6 0.36 0.35 0.52 0.34
CIR and MIR respectively means Constant Interest Rate scenario and Market Interest Rate scenario.
12-month rate average annual rate
CPI - 2000S2-2007S2
GDP - 2000S2-2007S2
CANADA SWEDEN UNITED KINGDOM
RPIX - 1999Q2-2003Q4
CPI - 2005Q1-2007Q4
Table 4 - Unconditional comparisons - Mean Square Errors











Sample start 1999Q3 2003Q4 1999Q2 2005Q1 1999Q2 2003Q2 2005Q2 2003Q2 2005Q2 2000S2 2000S2 2003Q1
Variable CPI GDP Variable RPIX CPI GDP Variable CPI GDP CPI GDP Variable CPI GDP Variable CPI
Yt+h Yt+h Yt+h Yt+h Yt+h Yt+h Yt+h Yt+h Yt+h Yt+h Yt+h Yt+h
CB
h=0
t 0.891*** 1.162** CB
h=0
t 0.799* 0.535 0.381 CB
h=0
t -0.161 -0.699** CB
h=0
t 0.436 0.249 CB
h=0
t 0.551** 0.482 CB
h=0
t -0.064
(0.092) (0.410) (0.381) (0.715) (0.415) (0.435) (0.309) (0.288) (0.651) (0.207) (0.302) (0.270)
PS
h=0
t 0.066 -0.965 PS
h=0
t -0.070 0.581 0.143 PS
h=0
t 1.101 2.345*** PS
h=1
t-1 0.122 0.731 PS
h=0
t 0.216 0.176 PS
h=0
t 0.807***
(0.118) (0.603) (0.399) (0.770) (0.556) (0.697) (0.438) (0.280) (0.882) (0.233) (0.246) (0.265)
R² 0.94 0.43 R² 0.57 0.66 0.26 R² 0.41 0.88 R² 0.26 0.52 R² 0.87 0.78 R² 0.82
CB
h=1
t 0.865*** 1.118*** CB
h=1
t 0.493 0.481 0.361 CB
h=1
t 0.115 -0.925** CB
h=1
t 0.330 0.141 CB
h=1
t -0.196
(0.237) (0.345) (0.853) (0.566) (0.267) (0.256) (0.381) (0.483) (0.733) (0.279)
PS
h=1
t 0.154 -1.507*** PS
h=1
t 0.235 0.421 0.043 PS
h=1
t 0.433 1.753*** PS
h=2
t-1 0.159 0.117 PS
h=1
t 0.537
(0.256) (0.420) (0.933) (1.026) (0.406) (0.335) (0.416) (0.660) (1.184) (0.385)
R² 0.70 0.51 R² 0.34 0.36 0.12 R² 0.22 0.75 R² 0.19 0.03 R² 0.13
CB
h=2
t 0.957*** 0.980** CB
h=2
t 0.668 -0.297 0.335 CB
h=2
t -0.318 -0.420 CB
h=2
t -0.264 0.391
(0.292) (0.421) (0.485) (0.836) (0.257) (0.199) (1.130) (0.325) (1.249)
PS
h=2
t 0.121 -1.876*** PS
h=2
t 0.022 1.501 -0.358 PS
h=2
t 0.780** 0.500 PS
h=3
t-1 0.985 -0.913
(0.335) (0.577) (0.683) (1.025) (0.366) (0.263) (0.690) (0.791) (1.331)
R² 0.53 0.34 R² 0.31 0.29 0.05 R² 0.21 0.05 R² 0.08 0.02
CB
h=3
t 1.043*** 0.780** CB
h=3
t 0.420 -0.553* 0.027 CB
h=3
t 0.277 1.318 CB
h=3
t -0.051 -0.022
(0.253) (0.319) (0.350) (0.281) (0.296) (0.424) (1.302) (0.207) (1.070)
PS
h=3
t 0.171 -1.591 PS
h=3
t 0.337 3.074*** -0.969** PS
h=3
t 0.362 -2.065 PS
h=4
t-1 -0.173 -0.082
(0.331) (0.880) (0.687) (0.680) (0.394) (0.542) (1.084) (0.779) (2.705)
R² 0.35 0.21 R² 0.13 0.56 0.16 R² 0.07 0.14 R² 0.00 0.00
CB
h=4
t 1.085** 0.817 CB
h=4
t 0.457 0.076 -0.023 CB
h=4
t 0.011 0.866
(0.430) (0.577) (0.285) (3.691) (0.486) (0.326) (1.303)
PS
h=4
t 0.070 -0.023 PS
h=4
t -0.499 -2.228 -1.279** PS
h=4
t -0.192 -2.144
(0.514) (1.735) (0.996) (9.338) (0.469) (0.772) (5.169)
R² 0.24 0.19 R² 0.09 0.10 0.16 R² 0.00 0.07
Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors. *,**,*** means respectively significant at 10%, 5% and 1%. All samples finish in 2007Q4, except RPIX in the UK in 2003Q4 and Japan in 2007S2.
Yt+h is the actual value of inflation or GDP at the date t+h, CB
h
t the forecast made by the central bank in date t for h horizons later and PS
h
t by the private sector in date t for h horizons later
Base (2 months gap) Timing Correction (1month gap)
Table 5 - Conditional comparisons - Regressions à la Romer-Romer (2000)
SWEDEN UNITED KINGDOM CANADA JAPAN SWITZERLAND


















α 0.647 (0.501) 0.873** (0.337) CB
1
t-1 1.149*** 0.213 0.728*** 0.255
CB
1
t-1 0.586 (0.364) 0.324 (0.241) (0.314) (0.287) (0.126) (0.334)
PS
1
t-1 0.176 (0.342) 0.365 (0.222) PS
1
t-1 -0.095 0.622** 0.321* 0.447
RFP -0.786 (0.510) -0.963*** (0.345) (0.326) (0.212) (0.165) (0.305)
CB
1
t-1*RFP 0.365 (0.269) 0.371** (0.181) ∆RMSE (F
t-1) CB PS CB PS
R² R² 0.82 0.50 0.91 0.53
α 0.960 (0.699) 0.886* (0.462) CB
2
t-1 1.243*** 0.304 0.545*** 0.139
CB
2
t-1 0.520 (0.351) 0.103 (0.230) (0.224) (0.383) (0.122) (0.163)
PS
2
t-1 0.055 (0.357) 0.548** (0.223) PS
2
t-1 -0.183 0.430 0.579*** 0.486*
RFP -1.149 (0.659) -1.017** (0.442) (0.249) (0.565) (0.117) (0.246)
CB
2
t-1*RFP 0.575 (0.332) 0.462** (0.222) ∆RMSE (F
t-1) CB PS CB PS
R² R² 0.75 0.28 0.84 0.32
α 1.317 (0.978) 0.933 (0.598) CB
3
t-1 1.327*** 0.933* 0.550*** 0.544**
CB
3
t-1 0.894** (0.377) 0.396* (0.233) (0.218) (0.425) (0.112) (0.212)
PS
3
t-1 -0.473 (0.370) 0.237 (0.223) PS
3
t-1 -0.365 -0.690 0.618*** -0.582
RFP -1.074 (0.821) -0.770 (0.506) (0.273) (0.676) (0.147) (0.367)
CB
3
t-1*RFP 0.478 (0.418) 0.316 (0.258) ∆RMSE (F
t-1) CB PS CB PS
R² R² 0.76 0.35 0.81 0.49
α -0.658 (0.862) -0.091 (0.503) CB
4
t-1 1.198*** 1.354*** 0.395** 0.485***
CB
4
t-1 1.352*** (0.325) 0.467** (0.190) (0.326) (0.305) (0.181) (0.124)
PS
4
t-1 -0.006 (0.326) 0.612*** (0.190) PS
4
t-1 0.013 -0.030 0.772*** 0.400**
RFP 0.268 (0.738) 0.003 (0.429) (0.338) (0.574) (0.217) (0.152)
CB
4
t-1*RFP -0.149 (0.395) -0.023 (0.228) ∆RMSE (F
t-1) CB PS CB PS
R² R² 0.63 0.70 0.61 0.76
Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors. *,**,*** means respectively significant at 10%, 5% and 1%.
CB
h
t the forecast made by the central bank in date t for h horizons later and PS
h
t by the private sector in date t for h horizons
later. In the left columns, the RFP variable is a dummy variable that equals 1 when ∆RMSE > 0 (a positive ∆RMSE means
a superior forecasting performance of the central bank). In the right columns, estimations are separated according to whether











Interaction Term regression Slit-Sample regression
SWEDEN - CPI
Table 6 - Testing Endogenous Influence  31
Appendix 
 
A.1. Characteristics of each dataset 
 
For Sweden, the Riksbank provides 12-month change forecasts at different future quarters. 
These are regularly available for inflation (CPI) for forecasts 1 year (Q+4) and 2 years (Q+8) 
ahead from 1997Q1 and for all quarters from the current quarter to Q+6 from 1999Q3. 
Concerning the GDP, from current quarter to Q+6 forecasts are available since 2003Q4. The 
12-month rate forecasts in the current and the next 6 quarters are compared to the quarterly 
forecasts gathered by CFs. These are available since 1999Q2 for both inflation and the GDP. 
For these quarterly forecast comparisons, Inflation Reports, which contain forecasts of the 
Riksbank, are published around March 16th, June 8th, October 10th and December 7th, and 
surveys of CFs are published at the end of the first half of March, June, September and 
December. The following results are similar if we exclude the third quarter of each year, 
which has the largest timing gap between the central bank and private forecasts. 
 
For the UK, the BoE publishes year-over-year forecasts for the current quarter to the next 8 
quarters only for inflation since 1993Q1 with a scenario of a constant interest rate and for 
both inflation and GDP from 1998Q1 with both scenarios. Moreover, the measure of inflation 
has been the RPIX until 2003Q4 and the CPI-H since 2004Q1. These forecasts are compared to 
the private forecasts of CFs, which are available until the 6th future quarter since 1999Q2 for 
both inflation and GDP. The switch from the RPIX to the CPI-H is made in 2005Q1. Next, 
because of the change in the measure for inflation, the analysis of inflation forecast accuracy 
is separated into two subsamples for comparisons with CFs: the first concerning the RPIX 
until 2003Q4 and the second for the CPI-H from 2005Q1 because the two institutions did not 
forecast the same measure of inflation in 2004. Finally, the issue of the timing of publications 
gives a slight advantage to the CFs, which consistently releases its surveys one month after 
the BoE. Two other private forecast sets are also used: a survey of public attitudes to 
inflation, conducted by Gfk NOP, and inflation and GDP forecasts of “other forecasters” for 
two years ahead, available in each Inflation Report (Survey of External Forecasters (SEF), 
which is the average of 25 institutions, banks and miscellaneous forecasters). Both sets 
confirm the results obtained with the CFs. 
 
For Canada, the Inflation Reports are published in January, April, July and October of each 
year and provide projections of the Total CPI and real GDP at the year-over-year rate for the 
current quarter and the next four quarters, respectively, since 2003Q2 and 2005Q2. We 
compare the 12-month rate quarterly forecasts to similar projections made by the CFs. The 
timing of publication, however, is different: these quarterly forecasts are published in March, 
June, September and December. There is a strong timing disadvantage (and consequent 
information disadvantage) for the Bank of Canada (hereafter referred to as the BoC). It seems 
more reasonable to compare the CF’s forecasts from the preceding quarter to the BoC’s 
forecasts of a current quarter than to compare both in the current quarter. The CF’s forecasts 
from quarter q-1 are closer to the BoC’s forecasts of quarter q (a gap of 1 month between 
both) than to the BoC’s forecasts of quarter q-1 (2-month gap). Therefore, we provide 
comparisons on the standard basis (the ‘base specification’ in the tables) and with this timing 
correction.  
 
For Japan, the central bank publishes only twice per year: in the last days of April and 
October, the bank publishes the lower and higher forecasts of the majority of policy board 
members for the real GDP and CPI (excluding fresh food) on an average annual rate basis. 
These forecasts are available for the current year since October 2000 and for the next year at a 
regular frequency since October 2004. As a result, next-year forecasts are used only for MSEs   32
and are excluded from the regressions. For this study, we use the middle point of the range, 
which regularly coincides with the median forecast (which started to be published more 
recently). The forecasts of the private sector are taken from the CFs. They publish the 
forecasts of various institutions at the beginning of each month, and we take the surveys of 
early May and November, which have the smallest publication gaps between institutions. 
 
For Switzerland, the central bank publishes forecasts of the CPI for the current, next and 
following years twice per year since 1999Q4 and on a quarterly basis since 2003Q1. We 
compare these forecasts to the CFs of the current and next years, calculated on the same 
basis, the annual average rate. The Swiss National Bank publishes its Inflation Reports in the 
last days of March, June, September and December, while the date of publication of CF’s 
surveys is at the end of the first half of the same months. The timing of release favors the 
central bank. 
 
A.2. Description of robustness tests 
 
(i) Multicollinearity 
To check that the regressions are not distorted by multicollinearity (forecasts are correlated 
among themselves) as discussed by Granger and Newbold (1977), the actual variable is 
regressed on only one forecast at the same time: 
[]
hh
th C B o r P S t t t YC B o r P S αβ ε + = +⋅ +                                             (11) 
The objective of this univariate regression is to assess the validity of the previous regression 
with combined forecasts by simply comparing the explanatory power (the coefficient of 
determination R² of univariate regressions) of both forecasts, to confirm the outcomes of 
benchmark regressions when forecasts are compared one by one, not in combination. 
 
(ii) Additional information beyond the last information set 
It is important to assess whether the coefficient associated with private or central bank 
forecasts are significant due to the high correlation to actual data or because they provide 
information in addition to the information set known at the date of the forecast. Introducing 
an autoregressive term of the dependent variable (the actual data), one may assess whether 
the forecast really contains superior forward-looking information. In other words, is there a 
real added value of the forecasts beyond the lag of the dependent variable? Moreover, the 
variables are persistent, and this test allows the verification of the robustness of the 
coefficient associated with forecasts when taking into account this persistence, in the case of 
current quarter forecasts. The estimated equation is as follows:  
1 π π αβπ β β ε +− =+ ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ +
hh
th t C B t P S t t CB PS ,                                   (12) 
where the analysis lies in the significance of the coefficient associated with both the central 
bank and private forecasts.  
 
(iii) Economic Phases 
Forecasts usually have mean reversion properties (Fama and Bliss (1987), Kim, Nelson and 
Startz (1991) and Kilian and Taylor (2003)) and fail to forecast turning points (Neftci (1982), 
Diebold and Rudebusch (1989), Hamilton (1989) and Lahiri and Wang (1994)). The former 
property could lead to a bias in the benchmark regression because projections are 
underestimated in the upward phases and overestimated in the downward phases, while the 
second property shows large forecast errors when a turning point occurs. One possible way 
to check whether the previous outcomes are not distorted by these two characteristics is to 
restrict ex-post the analysis to upward or downward phases of the variable of interest that is 
being forecasted. Heterogeneity between the upward and downward phases and turning 
points is therefore ruled out. The main regression is estimated by dividing the sample 
according to economic conditions: rising inflation and decreasing inflation.   33
 
(iv) Controlling for the Second Mover Informational Advantage 
In the case of Sweden, there is no clear second mover advantage because the central bank 
publishes its forecasts after the private sector in March and October, and the private sector 
publishes its forecasts after the central bank in June and December. To verify that the 
superior forecasting performance of the Riksbank is not due to imbalances in the second 
mover advantage that would favor the central bank, we disentangle the relative forecasting 
performance when the central bank is the second mover and when the private sector is the 
second mover. 
 
(v) Individual Forecasters’ Comparison 
We compare the forecasts of central banks to individual private forecasts for Sweden, for 
which the comparison of the survey’s aggregate forecasts shows a clear advantage in favor of 
the central bank. The question is whether this advantage of the Riksbank holds for only some 
private forecasters, for a large majority or for all forecasters35. Kim, Lim and Shaw (2001) 
show that surveys do not completely capture the full set of new information available to the 
pool of individual forecasts and therefore tend to reveal inefficiencies (i.e., correlated with 
their own forecast errors). This inefficiency, associated with CFs, might then introduce a bias 
in favor of the central bank. First, it should be noted that this inefficiency might also apply to 
central bank forecasts, as Clements, Joutz and Stekler (2007) show for the Greenbook. 
Second, and more importantly, if the inefficient CFs favor central bank forecasts, we should 
find evidence of superior forecasting performance for all central banks. For 4 out of 5 
analyzed central banks, there is no superior forecasting performance, so if there is a bias, it is 
not significant. For the only central bank (Sweden) that exhibits a superior forecasting 
performance (where the bias might be responsible for this result), we compare the central 
bank forecasts to individual forecasts to avoid this inefficiency bias. 
CFs only provide individual fixed-event forecasts. Thus, the average annual rate forecasts of 
current and next calendar years of both actors are compared since 1999. We retain only the 
major individual forecasters of CFs who respond to more than two thirds of the surveys 
during the sample period. Due to differences in the planning of forecasting on a fixed-event 
scheme, the calendar forecast is compiled as the average of all forecasts made for a given 
year during the preceding and current years (except for the forecast of December for the 
current year because the Riksbank already focuses on two next years in each December 
report). For instance, for 2001, we compare the forecasts of March, June, September and 
December 2000, and March, June and September 2001. 
 
(vi) Other Private Forecast Sets 
Finally, we compare the forecasts of the central bank with a different set of private forecasts: 
the forecasts of Prospera AB. The Riksbank’s 12-month rate forecasts for 1 year and 2 years 
ahead are compared to private forecasts gathered via survey by Prospera AB, which are 
available since 1996Q1 for inflation. These forecasts are split into two categories: all survey 
respondents and only market players. Prospera AB surveys are published in early March, 
late May, early October and late November, which correspond to the timing of the 




                                                 
35 When forecasts of the central bank and the mean of the private sector are closer, the rationale for individual 
comparisons is weaker because there will inevitably be smaller individual forecast errors when the mean is close 
to the central bank forecast.   34


















































R² 0.24 0.00 0.19 0.06
Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors.
 *,**,*** means respectively significant at 10%, 5% and 1%.
Yt+h is the actual value of inflation or GDP at the date t+h,
CB
h
t the forecast made by the central bank in date t for 
h horizons later and PS
h
t by the private sector in date t 
for h horizons later
CPI GDP












































Numbers in parentheses are robust 
standard errors. *,**,*** means 
respectively significant at 10%, 5%, 1
Yt-1 is a lag of the dependant variable
 the actual variable forecasted, and 
represent the information set known 
at the date when the forecast is made
Table A.ii - Sweden - 
Robustness: Additional 








































Numbers in parentheses are robust 
standard errors. *,**,*** means 
respectively significant at 10%, 5%, 1
Upward phases are 1999Q3-2001Q3, 
2002Q3-2003Q1and 2004Q1-2007Q4
Table A.iii - Sweden - 
Robustness: Economic Phases
Variable Variable
Yt se R² Yt se R²
CB
h=0













































t -0.099 (0.585) PS
h=4
t 0.361 (0.623)
Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors. *,**,*** means respectively significant 
at 10%, 5%, 1%.
Table A.iv - Sweden - Disentangling the second mover informational advantage

















Prospera - ALL 1.78 0.11
Prospera - Money Market Players 1.44 0.45
Riksbank p-value
Prospera - ALL 2.08 0.29
Prospera - Money Market Players 1.77 0.32
Reported values are the MSE of both categories of private forecasters
and of the Riksbank. The p-value is for the test of the null hypothesis
 that the central  errors and private sector errors are equal.
1.89
Table A.vi - Sweden - Robustness: Other Private Forecasts Set
1 year ahead (Q+4) - 1996Q4-2007Q4
1.31
2 years ahead (Q+8) - 1996Q4-2006Q4
Riksbank Riksbank
National Institute - NIER 0.14 0.14 HQ Bank 0.85
JP Morgan 0.16 Nordea  1.12
Morgan Stanley 0.17 1.13
Nordea 0.21 SE  Banken 1.14
MEAN 0.22 Svenska Handelsbanken 1.32
HQ Bank 0.23 MEAN 1.35
Merrill Lynch 0.26 Öhman 1.41
SE Banken 0.26 JP Morgan 1.46
Öhman 0.30 Morgan Stanley 1.52
Confed of Swed Enterprise 0.35 National Institute - NIER 1.54
Svenska Handelsbanken 0.41 Merrill Lynch 1.56
Confed of Swed Enterprise 1.90
Finanskonsult 0.76 0.17 Finanskonsult 1.77 1.36
Alfred Berg 0.57 0.17 Alfred Berg 1.92 1.53
Swedbank 0.31 0.12 Swedbank 1.24 0.89
UBS 0.25 0.12 UBS 0.97 0.89
Skandiabanken 0.37 0.10 Skandiabanken 0.50 0.53
SBAB 0.15 0.11 SBAB 0.62 0.60
Econ Intelligence Unit 0.46 0.12 Econ Intelligence Unit 0.95 0.74
ING Financial Markets 0.41 0.12 ING Financial Markets 0.59 0.74
Reported values are the MSE of each individual forecasters
from 2003 to 2007 from 2003 to 2007
from 2004 to 2007 from 2004 to 2007
from 2000 to 2007 from 2000 to 2007
from 2002 to 2007 from 2002 to 2007
from 1999 to 2005 from 1999 to 2005
from 1999 to 2004 from 1999 to 2004
Table A.v - Sweden - Robustness: Individual Forecasters Comparison
CPI GDP
from 1999 to 2007 from 1999 to 2007  36
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Numbers in parentheses are robust standard 
errors. *,**,*** means respectively significant 
at 10%, 5%, 1%.
0.44
0.32
Table A.vii - Sweden - Timing 
Disadvantage of the Riksbank
CPI
0.86
0.65
 